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Abstract
Anti-exceptionalism about logic is the Quinean view that logical
theories have no special epistemological status, in particular, they
are not self-evident or justified a priori. Instead, logical theories are
continuous with scientific theories, and knowledge about logic is as
hard-earned as knowledge of physics, economics, and chemistry. Once
we reject apriorism about logic, however, we need an alternative account
of how logical theories are justified and revised. A number of authors
have recently argued that logical theories are justified by abductive
argument (e.g. Gillian Russell, Graham Priest, Timothy Williamson).
This paper explores one crucial question about the abductive strategy:
what counts as evidence for a logical theory? I develop three accounts
of evidential confirmation that an anti-exceptionalist can accept: (1)
intuitions about validity, (2) the Quine-Williamson account, and (3)
indispensability arguments. I argue, against the received view, that
none of the evidential sources support classical logic.
1 Introduction
When we reject the apriority of logic, we are left with a less glamorous
alternative. Basic logical knowledge is as hard-earned as the knowledge of
physics, chemistry, or economics. The fortunes of logic are no less tied to a
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posteriori evidence than other sciences. In Quine’s phrase, logic is as revisable
as the natural sciences:
[N]o statement is immune to revision. Revision even of the
logical law of excluded middle has been proposed as a means
of simplifying quantum mechanics, and what difference is there
between such a shift and the shift whereby Kepler superseded
Ptolemy, or Einstein Newton, or Darwin Aristotle. (Quine 1951,
40)
This is anti-exceptionalism about logic, a view more recently defended by
Maddy (2002, 2014), Priest (2006a; 2014; 2016), Bueno & Colyvan (2004),
Russell (2014; 2015), and Williamson (2013a; 2013b; 2017).1 At the heart
of the position are three familiar Quinean claims: gradualism, that logical
theories are continuous with non-logical scientific theories; revisionism, that
logical theories are revisable by pretty much by the same standards as other
theories; and nonapriorism, that logical theories ultimately answer to a
posteriori evidence.2
The anti-execeptionalist picture raises a number of questions. In what
follows I aim to answer three:
(i) What is a logical theory a theory of?
(ii) What counts as evidential (dis)confirmation of a logical theory?
(iii) Does anti-exceptionalism provide support for classical logic?
The backdrop will be some recent attempts at developing an anti-exceptionalist
account of theory-choice for logic. Roughly, the claim is that theory-choice in
logic is justified by abductive argument. Let us call this position abductivism.
For instance, one logical theory—say, a paracomplete theory—rejects the law
of excluded middle, while the classical logical theory accepts it. According
to abductivism, whether we opt for the paracomplete or the classical theory,
will be a matter of inference to the best explanation. What counts as the
best explanation will in turn depend on a number of theoretical virtues, for
1Some of the authors prefer to label themselves naturalists about logic. On my account,
naturalism is a special case of anti-exceptionalism (cf. Hjortland 2017). According to
naturalism, however, logical theories are not just continuous with, but rather subjugated
by the sciences.
2Not all evidence for a logical theory need be a posteriori. Anti-exceptionalism only
rules out the evidence being exclusively a priori. See Hjortland (2019) for a further
discussion.
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instance, fit with the evidence, simplicity, strength, conservativeness, and
unification, just to mention a few.
The three questions take on a particular form in the context of abductivism.
First, if logical theories are selected by inference to the best explanation, what
is being explained by the theories? Second, fit with the evidence is a major
criterion for abduction. But what counts as permissible evidence for the
anti-exceptionalist? Third, Quine claims that anti-exceptionalism supports
classical logic, a theory that according to him ‘enjoys an extraordinary
combination of depth and simplicity, beauty and utility’ (Quine 1969, 112–
13).3 Correspondingly, Williamson argues that once we adopt abductivism
as a method for theory-choice, classical logic is singled out as the best theory.
Will Quine and Williamson’s classicism be vindicated by abductivism? I will
argue that the answer is ‘no’.
In Section 2, I provide an account of logical theories that fits the anti-
exceptionalist agenda, and that is simultaneously broad enough to encompass
major disagreements about logic. In Section 3, I discuss three potential sources
of evidential confirmation for a logical theory: intuitions about validity, the
Quine-Williamson account, and indispensability arguments. I conclude that
neither of them offer convincing grounds for classical logic. Finally, in Section
7, I discuss to what extent certain non-evidential critera (strength, simplicity,
conservativeness) favour classical logic, before I turn to a brief conclusion in
Section 8.
2 Logical theories
What is a logical theory? To a first approximation, a logical theory is a
theory of logical properties. The main logical property, most would agree,
is validity. One chief function of a logical theory, then, is to tell us which
arguments are valid. After all, philosophers of logic routinely disagree about
whether or not arguments of a certain type are valid. Relevantists claim that
disjunctive syllogism is invalid, paracompletists reject the law of excluded
middle, while classicists accept both as valid. An account of logical theories
should therefore reflect that there are rival theories that disagree on the
validity of arguments.
We should be careful, however, not to confuse a logical theory with a
formal system. A logical theory is not a proof system or a formal semantics
with a consequence relation. Granted, formal systems typically contribute to
3Quine’s case for classical logic has met with criticism elsewhere (e.g. Arnold & Shapiro
2007, Priest 2006a).
Australasian Journal of Logic (16:7) 2019, Article no. 4
253
logical theories. Our understanding of the property of validity is improved
by formal counterparts such as model-theoretic consequence. But a logical
theory should not be equated with the model theory. The model theory is
not an account of logical properties in its own right—it is merely a formalism.
For it to be part of a theory it requires an application, and it is the logical
theory that states what the application is. No one is disagreeing about, say,
whether the law of double negation is classically valid. It is, and that is
uncontroversial. The disagreement is about whether or not it is genuinely
valid.4
Nonetheless, for simplicity I will sometimes talk about ‘the classical
theory’, ‘the paracomplete theory’, and so on. This is a simplification,
however, since there is strictly speaking no single classical theory. Roughly,
a classical theory will be one that equates genuine validity with classical
validity. That is, it accepts the law of excluded middle, Peirce’s Law, etc.
Similarly, a paracomplete theory is a logical theory according to which the law
of excluded middle is not genuinely valid. But the disagreement does not stop
with the extension of validity. The nature of validity is equally contentious.
Indeed, rival logical theories often do not have the same account of genuine
validity. Classicists, relevantists, and intuitionists don’t only disagree about
the extension of validity, they disagree about what is preserved in valid
arguments, about whether or not valid arguments are constructive or have
the property of variable-sharing.
It follows, therefore, that two theories can equate validity with, say,
classical validity, but nonetheless disagree about other logical properties. For
example, two theories may give different accounts of consistency, provability,
negation, and so on. For the classicist, negation is truth-functional and
bivalent; for the paracompletist it’s truth-functional but trivalent; while for
the intuitionist it’s neither. Similarly, logical theories differ on what the
logical form of an argument is, and about which operators qualify as logical
(e.g. first-order vs. second-order quantifiers). What is more, there is no
agreement on the truth-bearers that constitute an argument. According to
some views, logical consequence is a relation on propositions, for others it is
sentences, or even utterances.5 In other words, both the consequence relation
and its relata are up for grabs in logical theories.
What sorts of properties are logical properties? That varies from logical
theory to logical theory. This is not the place for an exhaustive taxonomy of
4The term ‘genuine validity’ is from Field (2015). Priest (2014) introduces the idea that
what the disagreement is about is the ‘canonical application’ of logical systems, namely
the application to deductive reasoning.
5See Russell (2008) and Zardini (2014) for more on the relata of logical consequence.
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logical theories, but there are some distinctions we will do well to keep in
mind. A key divide is between metalinguistic and non-metalinguistic theories.
Metalinguistic theories hold that validity is a property of language. There
is no shortage of examples: Carnap’s (1937) conventionalism about logic,
Dummett’s (1991) inferentialism, and Shapiro’s (2014) logic-as-modelling.
In contrast, non-metalinguistic theories claim that validity is ultimately a
property of the non-linguistic world. Russell’s (1918) logical atomism is an
early example, but more recent variants include Williamson (2013b; 2017),
Sider (2013), and Maddy (2014). The divide concerns the foundations of
validity as a property, but it also raises questions about the relata of valid
arguments. Are they linguistic entities (e.g. sentences), or are they Russellian
propositions or states of affairs?
Moreover, metalinguistic and non-metalinguistic logical theories are sup-
ported by different types of evidence. In virtue of being theories about
language, metalinguistic theories are typically supported by semantic con-
siderations. One example, which remains anti-exceptionalist in spirit, is
Shapiro (2014). According to Shapiro, logical theories are theories about
natural language expressions, their semantics and inferential role. On this
picture, rival logical theories offer different semantic models of natural lan-
guage connectives and quantifiers. Logical theories of this sort are presumably
supported by semantic evidence, for instance by eliciting language intuitions
from competent speakers. Indeed, Shapiro suggests we apply the methodology
directly to expressions such as ‘is valid’ by testing for covert variables that
are fixed by context (ibid., 114–20).
In contrast, semantic evidence is not especially relevant to non-metalinguistic
theories. In Williamson’s (2017) non-metalinguistic theory, logical claims are
ultimately just unrestricted generalizations about the world. Consider a toy
example, the validity of the law of excluded middle:
(1) ( ϕ_ ϕ
The suggestion is that a logical theorem can be expressed as an unrestricted
generalization in a higher-order background language:
(2) @XpX _ Xq
The claim in 2 is the universal generalization of 1, that is, the latter’s non-
logical expressions are replaced by appropriate variables.6 The schematic
claim in 1 is typically weaker than the objectual claim in 2. The former is
6See Williamson (2013b, 200).
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simply a shorthand for saying that every sentence of the right form is true. In
contrast, the latter makes an unrestricted claim about the world, regardless
of potential limitations of the language in question. Williamson’s point is
that 2 is not a metalinguistic claim, but an unrestricted generalization about
matters in the world—linguistic or non-linguistic. The analysis anchors claims
about validity to strictly non-metalinguistic affairs. What is more, 2 avoids
talk of necessity, logical truth, or other modal notions. Both features are
among the chief virtues of Tarski’s model-theoretic analysis of validity.
It does not matter for my purposes whether validity actually can, or
ought to, be expressed by unrestricted generalizations.7 The point is just that
logical theories may be metalinguistic or non-metalinguistic. What matters
is that the choice will be reflected in the evidence required to confirm or
disconfirm the theory. I will return to the issue of evidence in detail in Section
3.
A logical theory, then, can be either metalinguistic or non-metalinguistic,
depending on its claims about validity. Another important question is whether
logical theories are normative or descriptive. The short answer is that on
the account I am developing here, logical theories are descriptive. It is true
that logic as a discipline contains normative projects. It gives prescriptions
about how we ought to reason deductively, it tells us what we may infer, and
what we are committed to. Put in epistemological terms, logic is sometimes
seen as providing norms of belief.8 But logical theories, in the present sense,
are not normative. Rather, they describe logical properties by, for example,
attributing validity to arguments, or properties such as truth-preservation
and variable-sharing to validity. Exactly what is being described—language
or the world—will depend on the theory in question.9
It will therefore be important to keep logical theories separate from theories
of belief-formation, belief-revision, and reasoning.10 The latter theories are
primarily concerned with norms of rational belief. And although a theory
of validity and other logical properties certainly will inform theories about
reasoning, and vice versa, that is a downstream consequence.11 It is possible
to subscribe to the same logical theory, the same account of validity, without
7There are a number of problems, some of which are discussed in Hjortland (2017).
8Alternatively, logic can be seen as governing norms for assertion and denial, or for
acceptance and rejection. See for example Restall (2005) and Hjortland (2014).
9There is another descriptive issue I’m not discussing here. One type of theory gives
a description of how agents actually reason. That is subject matter of theories in the
psychology of reasoning.
10It is a distinction most successfully promoted by Harman (1984; 1986).
11See MacFarlane (2004), Field (2009), and Steinberger (2016; 2019) for a number of
proposals about the connection between logical properties and norms.
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therefore also agreeing about the normative status of logic. Two logicians who
both support the classical theory of consistency, for example, might disagree
about the normative upshot for inconsistent belief sets, say, because of the
Preface Paradox. Conversely, two distinct logical theories may be compatible
with a single theory of inference and belief revision.
3 Abductivism and evidence
There is a wide variety of claims a logical theory can make, and hence a
wide variety of claims that require evidential support. When we now turn to
evidential confirmation of logical theories, however, the main concern will not
be the individual claims but entire theories. In what follows I will assume
that some form of abductivism for logical theories is correct. Rival logical
theories joust for position by better accommodating the evidence.
A number of philosophers have recently supported abductivism. Russell
(2015, 8), for example, gives an account of how we come to justify our logical
beliefs. Her main point is that reasoning, and specifically inference to the
best explanation, is more basic than logical theories:
The simplicity, elegance, fertility, low-cost, and explanatory power
of an entire logical theory played a part in the [...] reasons for
believing or not believing it and its parts. [...] Once we got
beyond very early pre-theoretic reasoning, logical laws like the
law of excluded middle were given up or adopted as a part of an
entire logical theory.
There are two things we should note. First, confirmational holism is part
of the account. A logical theory is confirmed en bloc, not by individual
confirmation of logical laws. Second, Russell lists a number of theoretical
virtues that will help us choose between candidate logical theories. These
virtues are all familiar from theory choice in general philosophy of science,
and they are also endorsed by other anti-exceptionalists about logic. Here is
Priest (2014):
Given any theory, in science, metaphysics, ethics, logic, or any-
thing else, we choose the theory which best meets those criteria
which determine a good theory. Principal amongst these is ade-
quacy to the data for which the theory is meant to account. In
the present case, these are those particular inferences that strike
us as correct or incorrect. This does not mean that a theory
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which is good in other respects cannot overturn aberrant data.
As is well recognised in the philosophy of science, all things are
fallible: both theory and data. Adequacy to the data is only
one criterion, however. Others that are frequently invoked are:
simplicity, non-(ad hocness), unifying power, fruitfulness. (Priest
2014, 217)
The virtues suggested by Priest are to a large extent the same as Russell’s,
but his emphasis is on adequacy to the data.
Finally, Williamson (2017, 14) echoes the same list of theoretical virtues,
insisting that they are part of an abductive methodology:
[S]cientific theory choice follows a broadly abductive methodology.
[...] Scientific theories are compared with respect to how well they
fit the evidence, of course, but also with respect to virtues such
as strength, simplicity, elegance, and unifying power. We may
speak loosely of inference to the best explanation, although in the
case of logical theorems we do not mean specifically causal expla-
nation, but rather a wider process of bringing our miscellaneous
information under generalizations that unify it in illuminating
ways.
Despite the apparent agreement about which selection criteria apply, it is
clear that the criteria need further explanation. Their application to logical
theories will most likely differ from the application to non-logical theories.
Furthermore, the three authors apply the criteria to reach very different
conclusions about the correct logical theory. In order to have any practical
impact on the choice of logical theories, therefore, the criteria need careful
articulation. In addition, they should be assigned a weight that indicates
how they affect the theory-choice.
I have already discussed some of the selection criteria in detail elsewhere
(Hjortland 2017). In what follows my aim will be more limited. The main
concern is to identify what counts as evidential confirmation of logical theories.
The motivation is that ‘fit with the data’ is arguably the most important
of the theoretical virtues associated with abduction. (In other words, it is
assigned the greatest weight.) After all, in inference to the best explanation,
something has to be explained. That something is the evidence. A theory
can explain the evidence better than another, either by more fully accounting
for the evidence, or by offering, say, a simpler or more unified explanation.
The issue of evidential confirmation is at the heart of abductivism. It is
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frustrating, therefore, that there is no agreed upon account of what counts
as evidence for a logical theory.
4 Intuitions about validity
4.1 General remarks
Let us start out by looking at what the above authors say about evidence for
logical theories. First consider Priest:
One of the criteria may give pause, however. In the criterion of
adequacy to the data, what counts as data? It is clear enough what
provides the data in the case of an empirical science: observation
and experiment. What plays this role in logic? The answer, I take
it, is our intuitions about the validity or otherwise of vernacular
inferences. (Priest 2016, 9)
Priest is not the only one who thinks that intuitions play a central role in the
evaluation of logical theories. Russell (2015, 5–6) suggests that, although the
logical theory consists of theoretical concepts, it explains, unifies, predicts,
and regiments pre-theoretic intuitions:12
If you start with some intuitions and a few inchoate pre-theoretical
dictums, a theory with the virtues of classical logic is an enor-
mous leap forward. The virtues include: explanation, unification,
prediction, regimentation: classical logic explains what is special
about sentences like ϕ_ ϕ, but also, in a similar way, what is
special about other schemata, such as ϕ Ñ ϕ, and  pϕ ^  ϕq.
The theory predicts that they will be special, they are logical
truths. It also gives us results in cases where we may have
had no clear intuitions beforehand, such as with Pierce’s law:
ppϕ Ñ ψq Ñ ϕq Ñ ϕ. Sometimes the theory predicts results
which the student may initially find counterintuitive, such as
pϕ Ñ ψq Ñ p ψ Ñ  ϕq but further reflection shows it to have
been correct. In addition to explaining the presence of the prop-
erty of logical truth, the theory explains and predicts the presence
of other related properties, such as consequence, inconsistency
and equivalence. And moreover the same, minimalist basis does
the work in all of these different cases. That is elegant.
12In the example, Russell is talking about a student learning classical logic, but it is
clearly meant as a general observation about supporting and revising logical theories.
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A logical theory, then, is a candidate explanation of a set of intuititions about
the validity or invalidity of arguments in natural language. Of course, neither
Russell nor Priest is saying that intuitions are the only available evidence
(more on that below), but it is part of the evidence that a logical theory
answers to.
In order to show us what intuitions about validity are like, Priest (2016)
asks us to consider particular instances of arguments:
If Napoleon is in Strasbourg, he is in France.
Napoleon is in Strasbourg.
Therefore, he is in France.
What sort of intuition do we have about the argument? Priest claims that
arguments like this ‘strike us as correct’ (ibid.). Correspondingly, other
arguments will presumably strike us as incorrect. For example:
If Napoleon is in Strasbourg, there is war.
There is war.
Therefore, Napoleon is in Strasbourg.
Suppose you already believe the premises of the first argument. Then you
may very well have the intuition that Napoleon is in France prior to reflection.
Yet, that is not an intuition about the validity of the argument, but an
intuition about its conclusion. Indeed, maybe you will infer that Napoleon is
in France, and hence form the outright belief. But that belief is neither here
nor there with regard to the validity of the argument. Maybe the intuition
about the conclusion is the result of a triggered disposition to infer according
to Modus Ponens. However, having a disposition to infer is not the same as
having an intuition about the correctness of an argument.
Do we in addition have an intuition about the correctness of the argument
itself? Suppose you have no opinion about the premises. In that case, maybe
there is nonetheless an alethic intution that the argument preserves truth.
Alternatively, there could be an epistemic intuition to the effect that one
ought not believe the premises and disbelieve the conclusion simultaneously.
I am not going to argue against the existence of such ‘correctness’ intuitions.
If they do exist, however, there is still the question of their status as evidence.
There are some reasons to have reservations about how much evidential work
intuitions can do.
First, if the intuition is merely that the argument is truth-preserving,
there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that the argument is necessarily
truth-preserving. That is, the intuition better have a modal component to
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separate it from the intuition that an indicative conditional is true. Similarly,
an intuition that one ought not to believe the premises and disbelieve the
conclusion could attach to the specific content of the premises and the
conclusion. In that case, the intuition presumably won’t support the claim
that the argument is valid. The intuitions would have to be of a different
form, for example, that it cannot (pause for modal force) be that the premises
are true and the conclusion false. In epistemic terms, it is irrational—and so
not merely inaccurate—to believe the premises and disbelieve the conclusion.
Second, the intuition about the argument above is an intuition about
an instance of Modus Ponens. But a logical theory doesn’t make claims
about instances of Modus Ponens. A theory that endorses Modus Ponens
claims that all arguments of a certain form are valid. The problem is how we
bridge the gap between intuitions attached to a limited pool of instances and
the evidential task of confirming a universal claim. In contrast, intuitions
about the second argument are more straightforward. In order to count
the argument as invalid, all that is needed is a single counter-example,
although what constitutes a counter-example will differ from theory to theory.
The burden of evidence for validity appears greater. Attributing validity
to an argument is making a universal claim to the effect that there is no
counterexample. Priest is aware of the problem, and cautions that intutions
about argument correctness may be due to an ‘impoverished diet of examples’
(ibid., 10). I agree. That doesn’t mean that intuitions cannot be evidence,
but the strength of the evidence is limited.
Third, the source of the intuitions is a further worry. What are the
options? The intuitions could emanate from a rational faculty (e.g. Gödelian
intuition), but that doesn’t sit very well with the nonapriorist commitments
of anti-exceptionalism. Another option is that the intuitions are the result of
ordinary language users’ understanding of logical expressions (e.g. ‘not’, ‘if
...then’, ‘therefore’). The anti-exceptionalist can accept that there is such a
connection between understanding and intuitions without therefore thinking
that it gives an a priori justification. The semantic intuitions merely provide
defeasible evidence. The nonapriorist can even concede that the intuitions are
a result of analytic truths. It does not entail that the analyticity is sufficient
to provide knowledge, justified belief or even entitlement.13
If the intuitions are semantic, however, that leads to other difficulties.
It might sound promising that the intuitions attach to an understanding of
logical expressions in natural language, but the connection between logical
theories and natural language expressions is easy to exaggerate. At best,
13See Russell (2014) and Williamson (2007, chs. 3–4).
Australasian Journal of Logic (16:7) 2019, Article no. 4
261
logical theories account for highly idealized features of natural language
expressions, far removed from the many frictions of empirical linguistics.
Glanzberg (2015), for example, argues that a theory of the semantics and
syntax of natural language expressions does not provide an account of validity
or other logical properties. Why then should we assume that just because
evidence helps to uncover the syntax and semantics of natural language, it is
equally helpful with respect to logical properties?
More importantly, why should we think that our natural language ex-
pressions are a good guide to logical properties? Like all scientific theories,
logical theories sometimes introduce new concepts that replace old ones for
theoretical reasons.14 Consider what happens in non-logical theories. An
ordinary expression ‘mass’ or ‘star’ is replaced by increasingly sophisticated
and formalized concepts, which are better suited to the explanatory task. As
a result, relying on semantic intuitions about the defunct concept will lead
one astray. Logical theories are no different.15 The concepts most logical
theories trade in are not pre-theoretical concepts, but at best explications
of natural language counterparts. This is especially evident for theoretical
concepts such as validity, consistency, and countermodel, but even concepts
such as conditional, negation, and truth bear only stylized resemblance to
natural language counterparts. Understanding natural language expressions,
therefore, is no fool-proof guide to logical properties.
4.2 Intuitions and classicism
These more general concerns aside, do intuitions provide evidential support
for the classical theory? The situation is not clear-cut. On the one hand, it
is a strength of the classical theory that it does a decent job systematizing
intuitions about arguments. On the other hand, many of the most persistent
objections to classical logic are based on purported counterexamples where
intuitions differ. McGee’s counterexample to Modus Ponens, the paradoxes
of the material implication, and examples involving vague expressions have
all been used to argue against the classical theory. But there are droves of
other examples, some of which are catalogued by Priest (2008).
If we look beyond the intuitions of the experts, the intuitions look even
less promising. In fact, what we know from the psychology of reasoning gives
us reason to believe that intuitions depart significantly from classical logic.
14See Scharp (2013) for discussion.
15Priest (2006a, 169) makes a similar comparison when discussing Quine’s meaning-
variance argument. He also subscribes to the view that logical theories trade in technical
concepts (ibid., 170).
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When agents’ judgements about arguments have been tested experimentally,
the results suggest that the judgements are influenced by a range of nonlogical
factors. For example, judgements about instances of Modus Tollens vary
significantly depending on the subject matter.16 Should we count this as
evidence against Modus Tollens? Other experiments show a systematic
belief bias. Subjects are more likely to accept an argument if they already
believe the conclusion.17 A better approach is to insist, following Priest, that
intuitions are highly defeasible evidence. Theoretical considerations might
count against the data provided by intuitions, and ultimately tip the balance
(see Section 5).
Furthermore, it is not clear that intuitions help when it matters. Suppose
there are indeed some argument forms for which we have stable intuitions
about correctness. These arguments tend not to be the most contentious.
The controversial arguments are harder to solicit stable intuitions for (e.g.
explosion, classical reductio ad absurdum, Peirce’s Law). This suggests that
intuitions might provide evidence for logical theories, but that they will not
be of much help in singling out the classical theory. They are simply not
sufficiently fine-grained to distinguish between the major rival theories. That
concern becomes all the more urgent when we recall that a logical theory
not only provides an extension for validity, but an account of the nature of
validity. Even if the intuitions are evidence towards which arguments are
valid, they are hardly evidence for an account of validity itself.
5 The Quine-Williamson account
5.1 General remarks
Evidence for logical theories is not restricted to intuitions. Fortunately,
as Russell and Priest both stress, intuitions are commonly overridden by
other considerations. Generally speaking the logical theory is shaped by our
confidence in other claims, for example the claims of our best non-logical
theories. That should be no surprise when we consider that non-logical
theories need not be primarily empirical. We know from ongoing debates
that rival views of logic are the result of theories about vagueness, theories
about truth, theories about properties, etc. In general, semantic paradoxes
that challenge the logical orthodoxy are a particularly rich source of evidence.
16A famous example is the Wason Selection Task (cf. Wason 1966). A number of authors
have claimed to find content-sensitivity in subsequent experiments (e.g. Wason & Shapiro
1971, Griggs & Cox 1982).
17See for example Evans et al. (1983), Morley et al. (2004).
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Priest (2006a; 2006b), for example, takes theories of truth to be a decisive
source of evidence in favour of a paraconsistent theory. Russell (2015) uses
vague expression as an example of the sort of consideration that might lead
one to abandon a classical theory.
In contemporary debates, revisionary arguments have been promoted for
a number of theories, from quantum mechanics to vagueness. But exactly
how do non-logical theories help confirm or disconfirm a logical theory? I
want to look more closely at a specific suggestion that has received some
attention. It is a view that has been attributed to Quine (e.g. Wright 1986,
Field 2000, Boghossian 2000).18
Here is Field’s formulation:
Quine’s view is that one should evaluate alternative logics in
combination with theories of the rest of the world: given a theory
of everything, including a logic, one uses the logic in the theory
to generate the theory’s consequences. Then we choose a the-
ory, including a logic, on such grounds as overall simplicity and
conservativeness and agreement with observations. (Field 2000,
129)
Boghossian gives a similar, although somewhat more elaborate sketch:
According to [Quine’s] account, warrant accrues to a logical prin-
ciple in the same way that it accrues to any other empirical belief,
by that principle’s playing an appropriate role in an overall ex-
planatory and predictive theory that maximizes simplicity and
minimizes the occurrence of recalcitrant experience. We start
with a particular theory T with its underlying logic L and from
T we derive, using L, a claim p. Next, suppose we undergo a
string of experiences that are recalcitrant in that they incline us
to assent to not-p. We need to consider how T might best be
modified in order to accommodate this recalcitrance, where it is
understood that one of our options is to so modify the underly-
ing logic of T that the offending claim p is no longer derivable
from it. We need to consider, that is, various ordered pairs of
theory and logic— ă T, L ą, ă T 1, L ą, ă T 2, L ą..., ă T, L1 ą,
ă T, L2 ą...—picking that pair that entails the best set of ob-
servation sentences. Whatever logic ends up being so selected
is the logic that is maximally justified by experience. In rough
18As far as I know, Quine does not formulate the view in detail, although it is a plausible
interpretation of Quine (1951).
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schematic outline, that is the Quinean picture. (Boghossian 2000,
233)
The account has found a more recent champion in Williamson (2017), and
since it is his formulation I will go on to discuss, I call it the ‘Quine-Williamson
account’. Suppose that we have two rival consequence operators (1 and (2.
Let Γ be a set of sentences—we will call it the antecedent theory. Consider
the closures of Γ under (1 and (2: Cn(1pΓq and Cn(2pΓq.
Suppose that we are comparing the consequence relations (1 and
(2. Then we should not simply compare the theorems of (1 with
the theorems of (2. Rather, we should compare the theories they
generate from independently well-confirmed sentences, such as
well-established principles of physics. That is, we should compare
Cn(1pΓq with Cn(2pΓq as theories for various independently
well-confirmed sets Γ of sentences of L. We require Γ to be
highly confirmed because the best of logics will draw some bad
conclusions from bad premises, and for reasons of methodological
fairness we require the confirmation to be independent in the
sense that it is not too sensitive to the choice of logic. Comparing
the theorems of the consequence relations is just the limiting
case where Γ “ tu, for the empty set is vacuously well-confirmed.
(Williamson 2017, 13–4)
One of Williamson’s motivations is that the account of evidence for logical
theories is non-metalinguistic.19 Given that the antecedent theory Γ is
non-metalinguistic (e.g. a theory of physics), the closure Cn(ipΓq (i P
t1, 2uq is also non-metalinguistic. The assessment of Cn(ipΓq, therefore,
relies primarily on non-metalinguistic evidence. The sentences in Γ are not
specifically about validity or other logical properties. They are run of the mill
claims about the world. When we compare the two output theories, then, we
are comparing them with respect to evidence about non-metalinguistic states
of affairs. The result is indirect confirmation or disconfirmation of logical
theories, without logic-specific evidence.
Suppose that we start with a well-confirmed antecedent theory Γ and a
consequence relation (.20 The members of Γ could for instance be generaliza-
tions or laws from physics, chemistry, or economics. What happens if there is
19Recall the distinction between metalinguistic and non-metalinguistic theories in Section
2.
20It might be problematic to require that Γ be ‘highly confirmed’ (see the quote from
Williamson above). We want to know what follows logically from an explicitly inconsistent
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a sentence A P Cn(pΓq that is independently disconfirmed by evidence? That
leads to a conflict: The direct evidence tells against A, but the antecedent
theory Γ closed under ( tells in favour of it. There are different ways of
resolving the tension. Depending on the strength of the evidence in question,
we might either maintain A despite the evidence, or give up some member
of Γ such that the revised theory Γ1 does not have A in its (-closure. The
third option is the one that concerns logical theories. We can give up the
consequence relation (, or, more precisely, give up the relevant claims of
the logical theory that provided (. Instead we close the theory Γ under a
consequence operator Cn(1 that does not produce A.
Let us consider an example in some more detail. Suppose you have two
rival consequence operators, Cn(1 and Cn(2 , the first of which satisfies
disjunctive syllogism (i.e. A_B, A (1 B), the other not. What constitutes
evidence for and against a theory that holds disjunctive syllogism to be valid?
Presumably, any account of validity will require that in order for disjunctive
syllogism to be valid, it has to be the case that whenever A _ B, A P Γ,
B P Cn(pΓq. So let Γ be a well-confirmed antecedent theory, and suppose,
for some particular sentences p, q: p _ q, p P Γ. If it turns out that q is
an independently disconfirmed sentence, then it is tempting to conclude
that there is evidence against the validity of disjunctive syllogism.21 How
suggestive is that evidence? It is by no means conclusive. There is still the
possibility that despite its plausibility, the antecedent theory Γ ought to be
overturned. Alternatively, it may be that the evidence against q has been
misleading. In other words, rejecting the validity of disjunctive syllogism, or
any other argument form, is no mean feat.
On the other hand, the evidential burden is even greater when we want
to include the validity of an argument form. Suppose again that Γ is a
well-confirmed antecedent theory. First, it would be too stringent to require
that whenever A_B, A P Γ, B is well-confirmed. In many cases there will
be no evidence either way for B, and that shouldn’t necessarily be evidence
against the validity of the argument form. (For many sentences, the only
available evidence is that they are logical consequences of well-confirmed
sentences.) In the unlikely event that whenever A _ B, A P Γ, B is not
disconfirmed, we have something close to the optimal evidential support. Yet,
theory. In fact, the law of explosion is a highly contentious logical law. And even if a
subtly inconsistent theory might be highly confirmed, an explicitly inconsistent theory is
unlikely to be.
21Note that it is unfortunate to insist that  q is well-confirmed, given that for some
logical theories there will sentences A such that A and  A are both well-confirmed (e.g.
because A is paradoxical and therefore both true and false).
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that is still only relative to a particular antecedent theory Γ. More generally,
we would like it to be the case that, for every well-confirmed antecedent
theory Γ, whenever A_B, A P Γ, B is not disconfirmed. It is even better
if B subsequently receives independent confirmation, but that cannot always
be expected. Instead it may be that future evidence tells against B, in which
case we are back in the old predicament: reject Γ or reject the consequence
relation.
5.2 The Quine-Williamson account and classicism
According to Williamson, this account of evidence supports the classical
logical theory. It provides the evidential confirmation that ultimately fuels
an abductive argument for classical logic. Other factors such as strength
and simplicity also play a role, but they are presumably secondary. (We will
revisit them in Section 7.) The question, then, is why we should think that a
classical theory does particularly well given the Quine-Williamson account.
Let us start by looking at some concrete cases.
Mathematics: One case that is typically thought to be favourable to
the classical theory is mathematics. Let Γ be the Peano axioms of arithmetic,
and Cn(CL the first-order classical consequence operator. Then Peano
Arithmetic (PA) is given by Cn(CLpΓq. It is hard to deny that the classical
formalization of arithmetic is a success story. Classical logic has provided an
illuminating regimentation of informal proofs, one that captures the practice
of working mathematicians and assists the in search for new theorems and
new proofs. The classical consequence operator is, in other words, supported
by the arithmetic theory. It delivers no dubious conclusions, nor do we
have an alternative consequence operator that delivers better results. Worse,
combining arithmetic with nonclassical logics undercuts powerful results.
Even if nonclassical arithmetics are underexplored, it seems to count against
them that they have generated only limited mathematical interest.22 True,
there remains controversial questions, such as whether we should prefer a
second-order consequence relation to a first-order, but nothing that threatens
to undermine the choice of classical logic in mathematics.
So mathematical theories provide evidential confirmation for the classical
theory. That should be no surprise, since classical logic was developed
precisely in order to formalize mathematical proof. If it had not been suited
22They do deserve better, however. See Weber (2010, 2012) for some honest toil in
nonclassical mathematics. See also Shapiro (2014) about why we should be pluralists about
logic in mathematics.
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for that purpose, it would not have had such an auspicious start. Rather, it
is the unparalleled success of classical logic in mathematics that has led to
its canonization, and in turn to its application beyond mathematics. The
question is not whether classical logic is a good fit with mathematics, but
whether it is wise to conclude more ambitiously that classical logic fits all
purposes. Since it is favoured by mathematics, the classical theory already
has a head start over its competitors. To the extent that mathematics is
involved in other theories (e.g. physics, chemistry, economics), classical logic
also appears to be a reasonable companion to our best theories. We will look
closer at the argument from mathematics in Section 6.
Quantum mechanics: What, then, can be said against the classical
theory? In order to answer that, let us first consider what would constitute
evidence against the classical theory. A possible scenario would be that an
empirically well-confirmed theory cannot be closed under classical consequence
without resulting in independently unlikely conclusions. The closest we have
been to that is the potential revision of classical logic in favour of quantum
logic. Following an observation by Birkhoff & von Neumann (1937), Putnam
(1969) argued that ‘[w]e live in a world with a non-classical logic.’ That is a
dramatic conclusion, and one that Putnam first modifies, and then rejects
(cf. Putnam 1981, 2012). Even if quantum logic has gone out of favour,
however, it serves as an apt illustration of how the Quine-Williamson account
in principle could lead us to reject the classical theory.
In classical mechanics, physical events are represented mathematically by
subsets of phase spaces, i.e. coordinates for position and momentum. The
physical events together with set-theoretic operations yield a Boolean algebra.
If we think of the physical events as propositions, and, correspondingly,
the set-theoretic operations as logical connectives, classical mechanics is
governed by classical logic. In quantum mechanics, however, the mathematical
representation of propositions as subspaces of a Hilbert space gives rise to a
non-distributive lattice. With the meet, join, and orthocomplement operators
interpreted as logical connectives, the result is a logic where the law of
distributivity fails (i.e. A^ pB _ Cq * pA^Bq _ pA^ Cq)—more precisely,
quantum logic.
Putnam’s (1969) methodology is precisely the one suggested byWilliamson,
although Williamson of course rejects the revisionary conclusion. Putnam
argues that if quantum mechanics is closed under classical logic, the result
is conclusions that are indefensible—in particular, that the measurements
‘disturb the very magnitude they seek to measure’ (ibid., 183). What is worse,
the parts of quantum mechanics that deliver the problematic conclusions are
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experimentally well-confirmed. The rest is a cost-benefit analysis. Putnam
claims that classical logic ought to be abandoned in favour of quantum logic,
which purportedly does not produce the same problematic conclusions.
Putnam’s revisionary argument has been discredited for a number of
reasons (cf. Maudlin 2005), but the debate seems to partly vindicate the
proposed methodology of the Quine-Williamson account. If a well-confirmed
theory delivers unpalatable conclusions when closed under a consequence
operator, that counts as evidence against the consequence operator. In the
case of quantum logic, the sticking point was whether we would rather live
with the conclusions or give up classical logic. The subsequent development
has sided resoundingly with classical logic.
Semantic paradoxes: It is telling that the most fertile ground for
revisionary arguments is not the empirical claims of natural sciences. It is,
rather, philosophical theories. The standard case against classical logic is
not quantum mechanics or anything in the neighbourhood, but the semantic
paradoxes. The reason, I suspect, is that in the case of the semantic para-
doxes the problem is not only that classical logic yields evidentially unlikely
consequences, but that it is simply inconsistent with desirable non-logical
claims. A familiar example is formal theories of truth. Suppose Γ is the
Peano axioms together with the unrestricted T -schema (i.e. T pxAyq Ø A).
The closure CnCLpΓq is trivial since the set Γ is classically inconsistent.
Recall that in the quantum logic case, the theorist could hold on to the
experimentally supported quantum mechanics claims in Γ, and, perhaps hesi-
tatingly, accept the classical conclusions. They might be unlovely conclusions
from a theoretical perspective, but they can be accommodated as part of a
cost-benefit analysis. On the other hand, the deflationist about truth who
is committed to the unrestricted T -schema cannot simply bite the bullet.
Unless one is willing to embrace trivialism, a fringe position to say the least,
classical logic has to go. A similar dynamics can be found in theories about
vague expressions. Tolerance principles for vague expressions lead to triviality
when closed under classical consequence. Unless one is willing to drop the
tolerance principles, classical logic simply isn’t an option. This explains why
Williamson (2017, 21) calls the semantic paradoxes the best case for revision
of logic. Although he thinks we should ultimately resist the revision, he does
acknowledge that the revisionary arguments need detailed attention. The
semantic paradoxes provide crucial evidence that any abductive argument
must account for.
Even if the Quine-Williamson account appears to capture the dialectics of
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at least some revisionary debates, it gives no conclusive advantage to the
classicist. The nonclassicist holds that there are semantic theories that the
classical theory cannot accommodate on pain of triviality. The classicist is free
to reject the antecedent semantic theories to save her logical theory, but that
comes with a cost. Likewise, since the nonclassicist rejects classical principles,
she must provide an alternative account of mathematical proof. That will
either involve a revisionist account of mathematics (e.g. intuitionism), or a
recapture argument to the effect that the nonclassical theory is compatible
with local classical principles for mathematical theories. Both strategies have
shortcomings—more about that in Section 6.23
Another concern with the Williamson-Quine account is that it might
carry a classical bias. Suppose we think that truth preservation is a necessary
requirement for validity. In that case, confirmed premises and a disconfirmed
conclusion constitute evidence against the validity of the argument. But, a
number of nonclassical theories claim that truth-preservation is a necessary
condition for valid arguments, but not a sufficient condition. According to
some of these theories, valid arguments preserve another property. Validity
is sometimes taken to preserve relevance, semantic content, information, or
warrant. If you think validity is a matter of truth preservation plus another
property, there is no reason to think that evidence against the validity of
an argument need be confirmation of the premises and disconfirmation of
the conclusion. For there is nothing preventing an invalid argument from
necessarily preserving truth.
Let us consider some examples that highlight the problem. First, suppose
we have a scenario with two rival logical theories, both of which claim that
truth preservation is necessary and sufficient for validity. Suppose further
that the first theory says that Modus Ponens is valid, and the second says
that it’s not. If there is an instance of Modus Ponens where the premises
are confirmed, and yet the conclusion disconfirmed, that counts against the
former theory. We might, for example, think that McGee’s (1985) purported
counterexample is an example of the type of evidence that is pertinent to
the dispute. (Although few would discard Modus Ponens on the basis of the
example.)
In the first scenario, the Quine-Williamson account presumably works
as intended. Now let us consider instead a scenario with two rival theories
where only the first claims that truth preservation is necessary and sufficient
for validity. The second theory claims that truth preservation is necessary
for validity, but it also requires another property. Moreover, the first theory
23See also Woods (2019) for an insightful discussion of the recapture strategy.
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claims that the law of explosion (i.e. A, A ( B) is valid, the other rejects
it. Finally, both theories hold that the law of explosion preserves truth.
What evidence can the Quine-Williamson account offer to distinguish the
two theories? Since both theories claim that the law of explosion is truth-
preserving, confirmation of the premises and disconfirmation of the conclusion
would be counter-evidence. But, confirmation of the premises is in any case
highly implausible. It is more likely that no counter-evidence is forthcoming.
In fact, it is likely that in most cases the premises will be disconfirmed.
According to the account, this is good news for a logical theory that claims
the law of explosion is valid. But that is misleading at best. The second
theory agrees that the argument preserves truth, and therefore gives grounds
to expect the same pattern of confirmation and disconfirmation as the the
first theory. It does not, however, claim that the argument is valid simply
because it is truth-preserving.
The Quine-Williamson account is supposed to offer evidence that assists
the choice between rival logical theories. But not all logical theories equate
validity with truth preservation. While the preservation of truth might be
supported by patterns of confirmation and disconfirmation, other properties of
valid arguments need not be similarly supported by the evidence afforded by
the Quine-Wiliamson account. Hence, even if the Quine-Williamson account
delivers credible evidence for or against logical theories, the evidence cannot
settle key disputes about the choice of logical theory.
6 Indispensability arguments
6.1 General remarks
The Putnam-Quine indispensability argument is a familiar naturalist defence
of realism for mathematics. Given the close connections between mathe-
matics and logic, it is seems sensible for an anti-exceptionalist to apply an
indispensability argument for logical theories as well. But despite the amount
of attention indispensability arguments have received in the philosophy of
mathematics, there is hardly any literature on indispensability arguments for
logic.24 One explanation is that since logical theories don’t trade explicitly
24An exception is Putnam (1971). Enoch & Schechter (2006; 2008) also argue that
certain logical inferences are indispensable for the success of projects we are rationally
required to engage in. As a result, agents are justified in applying the inferences in question.
Their proposal certainly has merit, but it is orthogonal to the present discussion. I am
not looking for an indispensability argument for what Enoch and Schechter call ‘basic
belief-forming methods’, but for logical theories as described in Section 2. Even if certain
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in ontology, indispensability arguments are inappropriate.
That is a mistake. Although the Putnam-Quine indispensability argument
has an ontological conclusion, it is mediated through an epistemological
assumption: since mathematical claims are indispensable to our best theories,
the mathematical claims receive indirect evidential confirmation. Field (1989,
14), for example, says that an indispensability argument ‘is an argument
that we should believe a certain claim (for instance, a claim asserting the
existence of a certain kind of entity) because doing so is indispensable for
certain purposes (which the argument then details)’.
Is there a plausible indispensability argument for logic? In fact, there is
a common argument in favour of classical logic that can be formulated as an
indispensability argument. The key components are as follows:
(Premise 1) Mathematics is indispensable to our best theories.
(Premise 2) Classical logic is indispensable to mathematics.
(Conclusion) Therefore, classical logic is indispensable to our best
theories.
I am simply going to grant Premise 1, and assume that there is some well-
confirmed theory, say, in physics, for which mathematics is indespensable. I
am also going to assume, for the sake of argument, that indispensability does
indeed incur evidential confirmation. That is certainly contentious, but there
is plenty of discussion of that elsewhere, and I don’t have anything new to
add to the debate.25
6.2 Indispensability and classicism
What I would like to focus on is Premise 2. Is it true that classical logic
is indispensable to mathematics? As I pointed out in Section 5, there is a
strong connection between classical logic and mathematics. It is hard to
deny that there are informal mathematical proofs that require instances of
characteristically classical arguments (e.g. classical reductio ad absurdum).
Without these argumentative steps the power of mathematical proof would
be severely curtailed. However, I do not think that the presence of classical
arguments in mathematics is sufficient to say that the classical logical theory
is indispensable to mathematics.
inferences (e.g. inference to the best explanation) are indispensable epistemic tools in
valuable projects, it does not follow that the claims of logical theories are indispensable to
our best non-logical theories.
25See Colyvan (2001) for a discussion and further references.
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Recall that the classical theory makes claims about validity. For example:
(3) The law of excluded middle is valid;
or
(4) Classical reductio absurdum is valid.
In the classical theory, 3 and 4 are universal in the sense that any instance
of the argument forms in question is valid. In other words, the claims are
stronger than what is required for mathematical proofs. For it is only certain
instances of these argument forms that are required for mathematical proofs,
in particular, the instances that concern mathematical properties. And there
is nothing preventing a nonclassical theory from incorporating instances of
classical principles, without therefore accepting classical validity wholesale.
Let us look at a simple example to shed some light on the possibility.
Advocates of an unrestricted truth predicate reject the classical theory, but
at least some of them want to simultaneously preserve classical mathematics
(Kripke 1975, Field 2008, Horsten 2011). This is done in a number of
ways. A well-known example is paracomplete theories of truth built on
an arithmetic language supplemented with the truth predicate. In these
nonclassical theories, claims such as 3 and 4 are rejected (together with a
host of other classical principles). But the theories nonetheless preserve
classical mathematics. In model-theoretic terms, the fixed-point models of
paracomplete theories are classical for the arithmetic language: no arithmetic
sentence receives a nonclassical truth value. Importantly, the logical concepts
of the paracomplete theories behave classically for sentences with classical
truth values. As a result, the classical principles such the law of excluded
middle are recaptured for arithmetic sentences and arguments. Of course,
the presence of the truth predicate will complicate matters, but for good
reason. The theory would be inconsistent if non-arithmetic sentences behaved
classically. For the record, it is not only paracomplete theories that have
this recapture property, but a number of nonclassical theories of truth (e.g.
paraconsistent theories, substructural theories).
The classical recapture can be viewed proof-theoretically as well. For
axiomatizations of paracomplete theories, classical reductio and the law of
excluded middle will be admissible given that the language is arithmetical.26
As we should expect, if the truth predicate is allowed in to the language, the
admissibility fails. Again, the point is that the classical arguments only hold
26See Halbach & Horsten (2006, 694). See also Restall (1994) for an example from
relevant logic.
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in special cases. It just happens that they are the special cases that matter
for mathematical proofs.
If one prefers to account for validity in terms of unrestricted generalizations
(cf. Section 2), there is another option for introducing special cases. If you
hold a paracomplete theory, you will reject the validity of the law of excluded
middle. That is, you deny the unrestricted generalization 2 that we saw
above:
(2) @XpX _ Xq
Yet, there is in principle nothing preventing the paracomplete theorist from
endorsing corresponding restricted generalizations. For example, let Θ the
class of mathematical propositions. Then the following is a special case
underpinning the application of the law of excluded middle for mathematics:
(2) @X P ΘpX _ Xq
This might of course be an unwelcome complication of an otherwise simple
theory. But the point is not to argue that theories involving classical recapture
are superior to the classical alternative. It is merely to argue that the classical
theory isn’t indispensable to mathematics. That is compatible with there
being reasons against the classical recapture that will ultimately lead us to
prefer the classical theory.
Maybe there is another strategy for claiming the indispensability of
classical logic. Mathematical proofs and mathematical theories rely on
the use of classical concepts of negation, implication, and quantification.27
That suggests a variation of the indispensability argument. Classical logical
concepts are indispensable to mathematics. It is certainly true that formal
mathematical theories such as Peano Arithmetic and ZFC are formulated
with the help of classical concepts. Even if these formal theories do not
directly contribute to other scientific theories, they are nonetheless the most
accurate formalization of mathematical concepts and theorems that do.
But just like nonclassical theories can recapture classical validity in special
cases, nonclassical logical concepts can recapture classical concepts in special
cases. In fact, nonclassical concepts are frequently generalizations of classical
27Williamson (2017, 22) uses this observation as an argument in favour of classical logic,
although he does not claim that it makes classical logic indispensable: ‘For any complex
scientific theory, especially one that involves some mathematics, will make heavy use of
negation, conjunction, disjunction, the quantifiers, and identity. Thus restricting classical
logic will tend to impose widespread restrictions on its explanatory power, by blocking the
derivation of its classical consequences in particular applications.’
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counterparts. Consider again the paracomplete theories. The negation of
Strong Kleene is a three-valued operator, but it generalizes the classical
negation in the sense that it remains classical for boolean values. More
generally, a number of nonclassical concepts can be characterized by the
following generalization of classical concepts:
f pxq “ 1´ x;
f^px, yq “Minpx, yq;
f_px, yq “Maxpx, yq.
The generalized logical concepts are versatile. They allow formalization of
theories that would be inconsistent with classical concepts, but they all the
same behave classically in the limit case where all sentences take boolean
values.
But the nonclassical response does not depend on nonclassical concepts
being generalizations of classical concepts. It is also possible to adopt a logical
theory that includes classical concepts, say, truth-functional connectives.
However, a nonclassical theory need not at the same time provide for these
connectives to underpin valid arguments in general. They might for example
be limited to certain language fragments or certain theoretical applications.
There is a worry that in some systems two connectives cannot cohabitate
without collapse. The standard example is that intuitionistic negation be-
comes equivalent to classical negation in a natural deduction setting. But
such nonconservativeness results are artifacts of formal systems, varying from
proof system to proof system. In any case, there is no problem with a logical
theory, in the sense prescribed in Section 2, containing both expressions,
given that their interaction is suitably controled. We are, after all, perfectly
capable of theorizing about and comparing the two negations.
None of this is likely to convince anyone to drop their allegiance to the
classical theory. But that is not the current aim. It is simply to illustrate that
there are ways of combining classical mathematics with nonclassical logics.
The classical theory might ultimately be preferable because of considerations
such as simplicity, but not because the theory is indispensable to mathematics.
We should, therefore, reject Premise 2 in the argument above, and with
it the conclusion that classical logic is indispensable to our best theories.
Although it is not ruled out that there are other indispensability arguments
available to the classical logician, it strikes me as unlikely. In any case, if
the classical theory has a priviliged role to play in non-logical sciences other
than mathematics, the case must be made. In the meantime, I conclude
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that whatever evidential confirmation there is for the classical theory, it
is not forthcoming from an indispensability argument. I am not, however,
identifying a particular nonclassical theory that is indispensable to our best
theories. Indispensability is a legitimate source of evidential confirmation
for the anti-exceptionalist, but one that presently does not help us select a
logical theory.
7 Non-evidential criteria
Even if the preceding discussion does not exhaust all possible sources of
evidence, I think it includes at least some of the types of evidential confirma-
tion compatible with anti-exceptionalism. The problem is that none of the
potential sources offer evidence that unambiguously points to a unique logical
theory. More specifically, therefore, we cannot conclude that the classical the-
ory is a better fit with the evidence than its rival nonclassical theories. True,
no nonclassical alternative stands out either, but the above discussion should
nonetheless temper the claim that anti-exceptionalism strongly supports the
classical theory.
Still, abductive arguments do not depend on fit with the evidence alone.
Abduction allows for a number of weighted criteria that together form the
basis for theory choice. So even if the choice of logical theory cannot be
made on the basis of fit with the evidence, the classical theory might score
better on non-evidential criteria. What could these criteria be? There is a
well-known laundry list of virtues from philosophy of science, for example,
simplicity, strength, elegance, unifying power, and conservativeness. These
are in fact the criteria that Priest (2014, 217) and Williamson (2017, 14)
suggest as reasonable companions to the criterion that the theory should fit
the evidence.
Let us start with some remarks on conservativeness. As a criterion of
theory-choice, conservativeness is in a sense upstream from the evidential
sources. On the assumption that the classical theory is our current logical
theory, conservativeness says that it has a pre-evidential advantage. We can
think of this as a preference ordering where the classical theory is ranked first
at the initial stage, and where abductive arguments reorder the preferences
at later stages. Unless there is sufficient evidence to dislodge the classical
theory from its prior position, no revision is called for. The burden of proof,
the conservative concludes, is on the nonclassicist. We have seen how difficult
it is to to support an outright rejection of a validity claim, so the advantage
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is decisive.28
If one accepts conservativism, and also that the classical theory is indeed
our current theory, then there is a reason to retain the classical theory if the
evidence is inconclusive. I don’t want to argue against that methodology
here. What is important is that conservativeness is not normally part the
grounds offered for the classical theory. When Quine, Williamson and other
classically-minded anti-exceptionalists defend the classical theory, they rest
their case on other criteria. Williamson, for example, rejects the conservative
approach, instead relying on intrinsic features of classical logic:29
The strong prima facie abductive case for classical logic just
noted does not depend on a principle of conservativism. It does
not rely on the position of classical logic as the status quo, the
logic we more or less currently accept, nor does it appeal to the
benefits of familiarity or the costs of change. It concerns intrinsic
features of classical logic, such as simplicity and strength, which
it would have even if we currently accepted some non-classical
logic. (Williamson 2017, 20)
Quine extols the virtues of classical logic in similar terms:
Classical quantification theory enjoys an extraordinary combi-
nation of depth and simplicity, beauty and utility. It is bright
within and bold in its boundaries. Deviations from it are likely,
in contrast, to look rather arbitrary. (Quine 1969, 112–13)
The question, then, is whether Quine and Williamson are right in thinking
that the non-evidential criteria unequivocally support the classical theory. I
don’t think that is the case, in fact, far from it. Let us look at two of the
most frequently cited theoretical virtues: strength and simplicity.
Previously I have argued that strength—whatever it means in the context
of logical theories—does not straightforwardly count in the favour of the
classical theory (Hjortland 2017). I don’t want to recount the arguments in
detail here, but the gist is that the strength of a logical theory should not
28In a related discussion, Harman (1984, 114) formulates a principle of conservativism as
a criterion in inference to the best explanation: ‘Conservatism is a factor in the sense that
one should not change one’s view without a positive reason for doing so and, in changing
one’s view, other things being equal, one ought to minimize such change.’
29See also Williamson (1994, 186): ‘[C]lassical semantics and logic are vastly superior to
the alternatives in simplicity, power, past success, and integration with theories in other
domains.’
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be equated with the deductive strength of a consequence relation. First, the
consequence relation is only one component of a logical theory. A logical
theory features claims about a number of properties, such as consistency,
provability, negations, conditionals, and many others. Second, deductive
strength is not a measure of explanatory power, the property of strength that
we most frequently associate with theory selection. And, third, subclassical
theories are deductively weaker for a reason, in fact it is their very raison
d’être. Only by restricting deductive strength can the subclassical theories
be consistently combined with theories of unrestricted truth or naïve com-
prehension. Finally, a reduction in deductive strength typically leads to an
increase in expressive power. In short, there is no shortcut to claiming that
the classical theory is stronger than its nonclassical rivals. It is certainly not
something nonclassical logicians should concede without further ado.
What about simplicity? Both Williamson and Quine mention simplicity
as one of the chief virtues of classical logic. Is there a case to be made for
simplicity being a tie-breaker in favour of classical logic? The immediate
problem is that it is not at all clear what the simplicity measure is supposed
to be. First of all, while simplicity ought to be a measure of the logical theory
in its entirety, it is typically used to refer to some formal property of a logical
system (e.g. classical model theory or a classical proof system).
Second, even if we let the misapplication slide, it is still not clear what
the measure is supposed to be. A first stab is that we are talking about the
simplicity of proofs. In that case, the claim might be that classical proofs
are simpler than nonclassical proofs. That is a line of thought with some
precedent. In the context of formal theories of truth, Feferman (1984, 95), for
example, states that ‘nothing like sustained ordinary reasoning’ can be carried
out in non-classical logics. If ordinary reasoning is classical, then Feferman
is right. However, many nonclassical logicians deny the antecedent. Their
point is precisely that classical logic cannot account for ordinary reasoning
with, say, vague expressions. More likely, Feferman has in mind something
like mathematical proofs. I agree that there are mathematical proofs that
require instances of classical laws. What is unclear, however, is whether this
means that nonclassical theories cannot accommodate the classical proofs as
special cases (see Section 6).
The simplicity of proofs is a problematic measure for other reasons.
Whether a derivation is simpler than another tends to be a highly system-
dependent matter. For example, nonclassical logics often have fewer proof
rules than classical systems. Surely that is one sense in which the nonclassical
systems are simpler. Of course, fewer proof rules might mean that finding
a proof is harder, or even impossible, but why should that count against
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the nonclassical system? After all, the nonclassical theory typically discards
the classical proof rules for a reason (e.g. they lead to inconsistency in the
presence of certain non-logical principles). Put more rhetorically, a simple
proof for a falsehood is too much simplicity.
The simplicity could also be a measure of the models or some model-
theoretic property. Classical models are simple: there are only two truth
values, one designated value, and the logical connectives are interpreted
by truth-functions. In contrast, nonclassical models have multiple truth-
values (sometimes continuum-many), several designated values, intensional
interpretations of connectives, and other unlovely complications. There
is a reason why nonclassical logics are not part of a first course in logic.
Typically they extend or generalize classical formalism in various ways. This
does not mean, however, that the nonclassical model theory is unnecessarily
complicated. Just like classical derivations have more components than their
nonclassical counterparts, nonclassical models have more components than
their classical counterparts. Classical derivations allow for more proofs, and,
correspondingly, nonclassical models allow for more counter-examples, which
in turn allow for greater expressive power.
Simplicity just isn’t a univocal criterion. On the contrary, it is a multi-
dimensional measure, if anything, and one that does little to support the
classical theory. That shouldn’t be a surprise. Even if simplicity is a theoret-
ical virtue, it is not one that we should assign a lot of weight. Rather, the
lesson from scientific theories is that simpler theories are often rejected in
favour of complications that affords explanatory strength. Classical mechanics
is simple, and since it is still applicable in many cases (e.g. macroscopic ob-
jects at low speed), it merits its inclusion in textbooks. That does not change
the fact that it is a theory with shortcomings that can only be addressed
by introducing complications, for instance, the complications of quantum
mechanics. The nonclassical logicians offer a similar picture. The classical
theory has elegant applications to logical properties in special cases (e.g.
mathematics), but it is a theory whose shortcomings can only be addressed
by the introduction of complications, specifically, the complications of non-
classical theories. Even if the nonclassical theories ultimately are not selected,
simplicity should not be the reason.
8 Conclusion
I have developed and discussed three accounts of evidential confirmation
of logical theories, compatible with anti-exceptionalism. I argue that the
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available evidence undercuts the received view, championed by Quine, that
anti-exceptionalism provides a justification for the classical theory. It doesn’t.
Anti-exceptionalism restricts the type of argument that can be given for a
logical theory, with the result that the choice of classical logic looks less
obvious. Of course, no one can deny that the classical theory is unusually
dominant, to the extent that it is rarely considered a mere theory. But when
we turn the anti-exceptionalist’s scrutiny to logic, we do not find sufficient
grounds for its position of strength. Classical logic is an elegant and diverse
formal tool, but that alone cannot undergird the classical theory as a theory
of logical properties.
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